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RHETORIC AND REALITY 
IN THE TAX LAW OF CHARITY 
Linda Sugin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The rhetoric of public purposes in charity law has created the mistaken 
impression that charity is public and fulfills public goals, when the reality is 
that charity is private and cannot be expected to solve the problems that 
governments can solve.  The rhetoric arises from a combination of charity-
law history and tax expenditure analysis.  The reality follows the money 
and control of charitable organizations. 
Due to this mismatch, the tax law of charity endorses an entitlement to 
pre-tax income and a bias against taxation.  Without the rhetoric, it would 
be clear that government wholly is responsible for public goods and 
distribution.  Without the rhetoric, charities would be transparently private. 
Public and private institutions should have distinct roles that derive from 
the identification of government responsibilities in a just society.  Only 
government is in a position to guarantee equality and freedom, and the law 
should not create expectations that private charity will fulfill crucial public 
obligations.  If government guarantees all the rights of citizenship, private 
organizations can focus on functions that government cannot serve.  
Charities have an important role in our heterogeneous society connected to 
fostering pluralism and diversity.  They should not relieve the government 
of its more fundamental role in ensuring just institutions.  On account of the 
rhetoric, tax benefits for charity have been subjected to too high a burden of 
justification.  Private organizations that serve the public functions of 
challenging government, guaranteeing pluralism, and safeguarding private 
values deserve the benefits that charities currently receive under the law. 
This Article contrasts the rhetoric of public benefit connected to charity 
in the law with the reality of private control of charitable organizations.1  It 
argues that the tension between the rhetoric and reality have produced 
norms of entitlement that undermine taxation.2  It offers an approach to the 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Many thanks to participants in the 
Fordham Law Review symposium entitled We Are What We Tax for helpful comments, 
Alexa Voskerichian, Fordham University School of Law class of 2016, and Sarah Jaramillo, 
Fordham Law librarian, for research support.  For an overview of the symposium, see Mary 
Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. See infra Parts I, II. 
 2. See infra Part III. 
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role of charity under the law by defining the obligations of government in a 
just society, qualifying the economic framework dominant in the literature 
concerning charities, and identifying what private charity can achieve that 
governments cannot.3  This Article concludes by endorsing the charitable 
deduction in the tax law on terms consistent with this revised approach.4 
I.  THE RHETORIC OF THE TAX LAW 
DESCRIBES CHARITY AS PUBLIC 
The rhetoric of the tax law treats charity as public by requiring public 
purposes for exempt organizations.  This rhetoric is embedded in the history 
of charity law and perpetuated by tax expenditure analysis.  It serves an 
important function today because it justifies tax benefits to exempt 
organizations and their donors, as well as the regulation of charitable 
organizations.  That rhetoric comes from the earliest legal treatment of 
charitable institutions, continues through today in the language of tax 
expenditure analysis, and justifies the tax benefits and high expectations 
society has for charities. 
A.  Public Purpose Rhetoric Is Entrenched in the Legal Regime 
The definition of charity in American law originates from England’s 
Statute of Charitable Uses.5  Passed in 1601, the statute coincidentally 
produced a legal definition of charity.6  Its oft-quoted preamble lists its 
broad charitable purposes, which included both relief of the poor and 
support of a variety of public goods.7  English charitable trust cases were 
the main source of this early interpretation of charitable purpose.8  Justice 
Story recognized the Statute of Charitable Uses as the “principal source of 
the law of charities” in the United States, and the Court further developed 
the definition of charity in the charitable trust-law context.9  Over several 
cases, the Court defined charity as:  (i)  property for public use and (ii)  
lessening the burdens of the government.10  In 1879, the Court defined 
charity as “a gift for a public use.”11  In Jackson v. Phillips,12 the Supreme 
 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
 4. See infra Part V. 
 5. See Lars G. Gustafsson, Lessening the Burdens of Government:  Formulating a Test 
for Uniformity and Rational Federal Income Tax Subsidies, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 787, 791 
(1997). 
 6. See Lars G. Gustafsson, The Definition of “Charitable” for Federal Income Tax 
Purposes:  Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33 
HOUS. L. REV. 587, 605 (1996). 
 7. See Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. 4 (Eng.). 
 8. See Gustafsson, supra note 5, at 795.  A charitable gift was “[a] gift to a general 
public use, which extends to the poor as well as to the rich.” Jones v. Williams [1767] Amb. 
651, 652. 
 9. See Gustafsson, supra note 6, at 609 (citing Joseph Story, On Charitable Bequests, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) app. 5 (1819)). 
 10. Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. 465, 506 (1860) (“All property held for public purposes is 
held as a charitable use, in the legal sense of the term charity.”). 
 11. Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 365 (1879). 
 12. 96 Mass. (1 Allen) 539 (1867). 
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Court of Massachusetts provided a definition of charity that encompassed 
the need for both the charitable class and the nature of the gift to be public.  
It stated that charity is “for the benefit of an indefinite number of 
persons . . . or . . . lessening the burdens of government.”13  That court later 
emphasized that “a gift for a purpose confined to that which is national in 
the sense that it might be supported at public expense and by general 
taxation is a close approach to a charity.”14 
In the United States, the definition of charity for income tax purposes 
also was grounded originally in the Statute of Charitable Uses and 
subsequent charitable trust law that defined charity as serving public 
purposes.15  A 1939 House Report discussing the charitable exemption 
states that the exemption is “based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden 
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public 
funds.”16  In Bob Jones University v. United States,17 the Court identified 
Commission for Special Purposes of Taxation v. Pemsel,18 as the “legal 
background against which Congress enacted the first charitable exemption 
statute in 1894.”19  The Court also characterized tax-exempt organizations 
as “entitled to tax benefits because they served desirable public purposes.”20 
The current definition of “charitable” as used in Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC) section 501(c)(3) follows this history of defining charity as providing 
public goods to relieve traditional government functions.  In 1959, the 
Treasury adopted language that included “lessening the burdens of the 
government” as charitable in regulations under IRC section 501(c)(3).21  
The current requirements for charitable exemption include an exempt 
purpose that requires an organization to “serve[] a public rather than a 
private interest.”22 
B.  Tax Expenditure Analysis Fosters the Rhetoric 
By constructing a framework in which charities appear to be the 
recipients of government funds by way of the charitable contribution 
deduction, tax expenditure analysis creates a strong impression that charity 
is public.  Tax expenditure analysis instructs policymakers to analyze 
certain provisions in the tax law as though they were provisions of direct 
government spending, and the tax expenditure budget puts a dollar amount 
 
 13. Id. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 14. Thorp v. Lund, 116 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass. 1917). 
 15. See Gustafsson, supra note 6, at 623. 
 16. H.R. REP. NO. 1860, at 19 (1938). 
 17. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 18. [1891] AC 531 (Eng.). 
 19. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 589. 
 20. Id. 
 21. The Statute of Charitable Uses language is part of 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) 
(2014) (defining “charitable”). 
 22. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). 
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on the revenue loss from the charitable contribution deduction.23  From a 
budgetary perspective, a tax expenditure is a substitute for an appropriated 
expenditure—the government can reduce taxes for some people on account 
of participation in certain activities, or it can directly appropriate funds for 
those activities.  Tax expenditures have been analyzed as the equivalent of 
federal matching grants to emphasize the government subsidy they 
provide.24  The implication of the existence of a tax expenditure budget is 
that the government could raise the foregone revenue if Congress repealed 
the identified provision.25  Government must be subsidizing charities if the 
budget shows it in black and white—and the subsidy looks large! 
The Treasury Department’s budget separates the charitable deduction 
into three categories by function, so that no aggregate charitable revenue 
loss appears in the budget.26  The latest budget includes three categories for 
2015 to 2024:  $69.4 billion for contributions to education, $68.5 billion for 
contributions to health, and (a whopping) $606.75 billion for the 
deductibility of other contributions.27  The “other” category is the tenth 
largest tax expenditure in the entire budget, and, if all three categories were 
aggregated, the tax expenditure for the charitable deduction would be the 
eighth largest overall.28  A $745 billion ten-year revenue loss in the federal 
budget29 suggests that the government is invested heavily in the charitable 
sector. 
More subtly, tax expenditure analysis creates a construct for treating 
donations as partly funded by the government because charities are not 
taxpayers.  Tax expenditure analysis directs its policy evaluation gaze at the 
taxpayer who claims a deduction.  Thus, when a policymaker sees that a tax 
expenditure is $X, she analyzes it as she would any appropriation in that 
amount.  This way of thinking about tax expenditures, namely as equivalent 
to direct spending equal to the revenue loss, led Stanley Surrey to suggest 
that the government pays for 70 percent of the mortgage interest of high-
 
 23. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES (2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/ap_14_expenditure
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4G8-QVUM]. See also generally JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=select&id=5 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/NW7V-JN7F]. 
 24. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions:  
A Substitute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377 (1972). 
 25. The calculation is not so simple because repeal of the provision would lead to other 
changes in the economy. See John L. Buckley, Tax Expenditure Reform:  Some Common 
Misconceptions, 132 TAX NOTES 255, 259 (2011). 
 26. The tax exemption is not treated as a tax expenditure.  This may be due to the 
difficulty of determining the normal amount of tax a charity should pay. See generally Boris 
I. Bittkker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). 
 27. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 240 tbl.14-3 (2015) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/budget/fy2016/assets/spec.pdf [https://perma.cc/36CA-F4P9]. 
 28. And almost as large as the revenue loss arising from the step-up basis of capital 
gains at death. See id. 
 29. Tax expenditures have a separate section, but are part of the Office of Management 
and Budget’s presentation of the total federal budget. See id. 
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income taxpayers (whose marginal income tax rate was 70 percent), but 
none of the mortgage interest of low-income taxpayers (who paid no tax).30  
Surrey believed that a tax expenditure that allows a homeowner to save 
$100 in taxes is equivalent to a $100 check from the government to that 
homeowner.  A reduction in taxes is a real economic benefit. 
The analysis for tax expenditures involving charities is slightly more 
complex because the tax reduction occurs for the donor, but the policy 
behind the deduction assumes that the donor does not receive the economic 
benefit of it.  The assumption underlying the deduction for contributions to 
charities is that donors gross up their contributions so that the tax savings 
they enjoy is passed along to the charity.  The deduction is an incentive for 
donors to increase their contributions, so the incidence of the tax benefit is 
on the charities.31  If taxpayers simply enjoyed reduced tax liabilities on 
account of the deduction, the charitable deduction would benefit donors by 
providing them with a bonus for giving.  It would not benefit charities, 
which Congress presumably meant to subsidize with the provision—and it 
would be a very odd provision from a policy perspective.32  If donors 
captured the tax benefits for themselves, people would understand the tax 
provision to reduce donor tax, like the homeowner in Surrey’s example.33  
Reducing a donor’s tax is an economic benefit, but it has subtly different 
implications than a direct public subsidy.34 
Where a charity receives the benefit of an increased donation on account 
of a tax deduction, it is tempting to argue that there is real public funding 
because the charity is not a taxpayer.  The subsidy cannot be conceptualized 
as a tax reduction where the beneficiary has no tax to pay.  In this way, 
charities are unlike individuals with home mortgages and similar to 
individual recipients of refundable credits.  The public sees a much clearer 
transfer of dollars from the government to the charitable organizations (and 
the poor recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)) where the 
recipient of the tax benefit is not otherwise a taxpayer.  Although it includes 
the outlay portion in its estimates in its tax expenditure budget, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation includes a footnote separating the refundable 
 
 30. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 36–37 (1973) (“One can assume 
that no HUD Secretary would ever have presented to Congress a direct housing program 
with this upside-down effect.”). 
 31. There is some conflicting data on whether the deduction is in fact an incentive. See 
Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg & Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income, and 
Taxes:  An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371 (2002); Jon Bakija & Bradley T. 
Heim, How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and Income?  New Estimates 
from Panel Data, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 615 (2011); William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, 
Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709 
(1995). 
 32. We need to better understand whether donors are being subsidized this way. See 
Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 23–
25 (2011). 
 33. See infra Part III.C. 
 34. Recipients of tax benefits like the home mortgage deduction do not see themselves 
as recipients of government subsidy. See Bryce Covert, We All Get ‘Free Stuff’ from the 
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/opinion/we-
all-get-free-stuff-from-the-government.html [https://perma.cc/Z598-4P4P]. 
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portion of the EITC from the nonrefundable part.35  That presentation 
suggests that there is something fundamentally different about the 
refundable portion and the nonrefundable portion of the credits.  The 
“outlay” label applied to the refundable part implies a greater level of 
government involvement than letting individuals reduce their taxes. 
C.  Consequences of Public-Purpose Rhetoric 
The rhetoric of public purposes throughout the law of charity is essential 
to the structure of the federal tax law of charity.  It justifies the tax benefits 
for charitable organizations and their donors.  The classic justification for 
charitable tax benefits is based on a subsidy theory premised on the goods 
provided by charities to the public.36  The exemption and deduction are 
good policy because they serve to subsidize the goods that charitable 
organizations produce.  “Charities generate primary public benefits either 
by providing goods or services that are deemed to be inherently good for 
the public, or by delivering ordinary goods or services to those who are 
recognized as being especially needy.”37 
The public-purpose rhetoric and the tax benefits that depend on it form 
the basis for the federal regulation of nonprofits that we have.  The federal 
tax law is the single most significant regulatory structure governing 
nonprofit organizations.38  But Congress never set out directly to regulate 
the governance or activities of nonprofits (as it has with for-profit 
organizations in the securities acts).  Instead, the regulation of nonprofits 
hangs on the tax benefits granted to them. 
The entire legal-regulatory structure depends on recognizing a 
jurisdictional hook in the charitable exemption and deduction.  That is a 
heavy justification for a fine thread.39  The leading authority justifying this 
regulation is the Supreme Court’s decision in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Washington.40  There, the Court upheld the IRC’s 
restriction on the political activities of charities by describing the tax 
exemption and charitable deduction as privileges that Congress can choose 
 
 35. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2014–2018, tbl.1, 34 n.4 (2014). 
 36. See John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of 
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:  A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 274 
(Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (“[The] most traditional of the 
normative arguments . . . holds that exemption and deductibility are needed to promote the 
provision of certain kinds of benefits to the public.”). 
 37. Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities:  Thesis, 
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV 395, 402 (1997). 
 38. See generally James J. Fishman, Commentary, The Federalization of Nonprofit 
Regulation and Its Discontents, 99 KY. L.J. 799 (2011). 
 39. See Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight:  An Alternative Approach 2, 8 (The 
Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs. at Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 33.4, 2006) (arguing 
that the IRS is structurally ill-suited to its charitable regulatory function, in part because it is 
constrained by the terms of the tax law authorizing oversight). 
 40. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
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to limit.41  The constraint on an organization’s First Amendment rights 
imposed by the lobbying/campaigning restrictions in section 501(c)(3) was 
considered acceptable because the Court treated the restriction as attaching 
only to a government subsidy and not to an organization’s rights to speak 
more broadly.42  This reasoning has elevated the importance of the public 
subsidy in the legal framework, even though that subsidy makes up a small 
portion of the total resources in the nonprofit sector.43 
By focusing on public subsidy, the rhetoric surrounding the exemption 
and the charitable deduction creates an impression that the government is 
attentive to, and invested in, charitable organizations.  Regardless of the 
reality, that focus in turn validates the requirement of public purposes:  if 
government spends revenue on charitable organizations, it must be because 
those organizations carry out important public functions.  Despite its facial 
normative neutrality, tax expenditure analysis creates an expectation that 
charities will deserve their public largesse by satisfying public purposes. 
Despite the influence of tax expenditure analysis, the public subsidy of 
organizations through the deduction is more ambiguous than generally 
acknowledged.  The incidence of the deduction determines whether donors 
are rewarded or charities are subsidized.  The deduction subsidizes charities 
only if it effectively incentivizes donors to increase their donation by at 
least as much as the tax savings.  If they fail to increase their giving, then 
the deduction operates as a windfall to donors, who are rewarded for giving 
to charity.44  Consequently, the charitable contribution deduction is as much 
about donors as it is about charities.  A single-minded focus on subsidies to 
charities misses a crucial part of the story. 
II.  THE REALITY OF THE TAX LAW MAKES CHARITY PRIVATE 
The last part explained the sources and consequences of the rhetoric that 
characterizes the tax law of charity as public.  This part examines the legal, 
economic, and governance structure of charitable organizations to challenge 
that characterization; it argues that charity is fundamentally private.  The 
next part, Part III, explains why the mismatch of rhetoric and reality 
undermines fairness in taxation. 
 
 41. Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are forms of subsidies that are 
administered through the tax system. Id. at 544. 
 42. Id. at 546 (“Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.”). 
 43. The relative dollar value of tax benefits compared to other sources of funds for the 
charitable sector is difficult to determine because it is not clear what tax would otherwise be 
paid.  If all funds available to all charities came from tax-deductible donations, the public 
subsidy still would be significantly less than half of all resources available.  Since the 
charitable sector collects more in fees for services than it does in contributions, the public 
subsidy piece is necessarily much smaller. See Quick Facts About Nonprofits, NAT’L CTR. 
CHARITABLE STATS.:  URB. INST., http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4L6Q-MSWG]. 
 44. For a more developed analysis of the distinction between a subsidy and an incentive 
and why it matters for charitable contributions, see Sugin, supra note 32, at 23–26. 
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A.  Choice Is Private 
The entire tax law of charity is built on a regime of choice, rather than 
obligation.  Nobody is forced to support public goods where the 
government operates solely through a tax deduction.  Because the tax law 
places that choice to fund in the hands of taxpayers, the charitable 
deduction creates an inference that the funding of public goods and 
distribution is a matter of private choice, rather than public responsibility.  
Under current law, government does not direct the overall level of funding.  
The level of support of any charitable good depends on the preferences and 
resources of individuals in a position to donate funds.  In this way, the tax 
law of charity makes the government less important and less responsible. 
Everything about the substance of the tax law defines charity as 
fundamentally private.  The tax law contemplates private creation, private 
governance, and private funding of exempt organizations.  The charitable 
sector is minimally regulated.  The tax exemption is in the nature of an 
entitlement for organizations that can fit within its broad terms.  Any 
organization can limit its activities in a way that satisfies the statutory 
requirements and creates an entitlement so that government has no direct 
control over which organizations will be eligible for the subsidy.  
Charitable organizations must apply for recognition of exemption, but the 
government does not determine the number of organizations, their total 
funding levels, or their functions.  While organizations must satisfy the 
regulation’s imperative to “serve[] a public rather than a private interest,”45 
the tax law contains no system for evaluating how well a public interest is 
served—an organization’s effectiveness in carrying out a public purpose is 
not subject to review.  The tax law’s enforcement capability is limited to 
monitoring prohibitions, not demanding results.46 
Evelyn Brody and John Tyler have surveyed the essential privateness of 
charitable organizations in an attempt to refute arguments for greater 
regulation of the nonprofit sector.47  They distinguish the implications that 
follow from the requirement that charities have public purposes from the 
claim that charities are financed with public money.  In the course of their 
analysis, they observe that private philanthropy is hardly public at all and 
conclude that the law recognizes “the importance of philanthropic 
independence, respect[s] philanthropies as private entities, and accord[s] 
them the right to autonomy without undue government or public direction 
and control.”48 
 
 45. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2014). 
 46. The government will move to revoke an exemption if an organization engages in 
politics, see Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 
1972), or engages in racial discrimination, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574 (1983). 
 47. EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY?  
SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH (1st ed. 2009). 
 48. Id. at 11. 
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B.  A Tax Deduction Is Weak 
The charitable contribution deduction represents a weak financial 
commitment to charity because it contains no unconditional commitment to 
public support at all.  It is weak because the charitable contribution 
deduction is only a percentage of private support, up to a maximum equal to 
the highest marginal rate of tax.  It is weak because the statutory definition 
for a charitable organization is broad and vague and requires substantial 
private determination for its contours.  The charitable contribution 
deduction is reactive, responding to the private choices that individuals 
make, requiring that the government follow the lead of private individuals 
and never empowering it to choose priorities. 
The choice of a tax deduction indicates that Congress did not intend to 
exert much control over charitable organizations, since a deduction-based 
subsidy fosters the private control of charitable organizations.  The tax law 
is only one of a variety of mechanisms that the government uses to 
subsidize institutions.  Compared to other mechanisms, the charitable 
deduction delegates much greater decision-making power away from the 
government to private individuals.  Donors decide how much to fund 
charities and which charities will be funded.  Self-perpetuating boards of 
directors decide which projects to pursue and how much to spend on them.  
The charitable deduction demands no accountability from any charity to the 
government as a condition of any particular gift. 
Compared to other mechanisms that the government regularly uses, tax-
based financing is contingent, stingy, and unpredictable.  For instance, the 
tax law of charity is in sharp contrast to the rules of public contracts.  Under 
contracting rules, governments fund, direct, and evaluate the activities of 
private organizations (sometimes charities, but not necessarily).  Private 
organizations carry out specific functions that the government chooses and 
that remain the government’s responsibility.  Unlike government 
contractors, charitable organizations retain complete autonomy when they 
are the recipients of tax-based support. 
C.  Tax Deductions Allow Individuals to Keep Their Money 
As described in Part I, tax expenditure analysis challenges the 
policymaker to consider tax expenditures as direct spending programs 
primarily for the purpose of drawing attention to their distributional effects.  
Surrey’s home mortgage interest deduction example makes that policy 
purpose plain.49  At most, tax expenditure analysis equates tax expenditures 
with direct spending from the government’s budgeting perspective, but it 
does not create a compelling parallel framework for individuals.50  A tax 
deduction does not necessarily imply that a homeowner is funded by the 
government.  Instead, a homeowner receives a reduction in tax liability and 
is allowed to keep more of his pre-tax income.  This is an example of how 
 
 49. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Covert, supra note 34. 
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tax expenditure analysis may be a useful budgeting tool, but is an imperfect 
legal archetype51 and an incomplete substitute for other perspectives. 
As a legal matter, the Supreme Court also refuses to equate tax 
expenditures with government support from the taxpayer’s perspective.  
The judicial characterization of the charitable deduction emphasizes the 
private nature of charitable contributions because it conceptualizes tax 
expenditures as tax cuts that allow individuals to spend their own money 
(and not the government’s).52  In Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn,53 the Court’s latest analysis of tax expenditures, the 
Supreme Court “transformed tax expenditures from state action, ordinarily 
subject to constitutional limits, into nonreviewable private spending by 
individuals.”54  The Court characterized tax expenditures as decisions by 
the legislature to not tax, rather than as decisions to subsidize.55  This 
characterization rejects tax expenditure analysis as a legal framework and 
undermines the public subsidy equivalence.  Tax expenditure analysis’ 
central observation that tax deductions and direct government spending are 
economically equivalent is legally irrelevant. 
At the same time, the Court’s legal characterization (over)emphasizes the 
private nature of charitable giving by ignoring economic effects altogether.  
In the facts before the Supreme Court, the tax expenditure at issue was a 
100 percent credit for donations to certain educational organizations.56  In a 
100 percent credit, the taxpayer saves one dollar for every dollar in 
contribution, so the public subsidy analysis would have been most 
compelling.  By treating the payments as purely private, the Court ignored 
both the central policymaking function of the state legislature in adopting 
the tax credit and the revenue effects of a credit that reduces tax by a full 
dollar for every dollar spent in a statutorily favored way. 
III.  PRIVATE CHARITY REFLECTS A BIAS AGAINST TAXATION 
The Supreme Court’s approach in Arizona Christian School supports a 
taxpayer’s right to pre-tax income.  The Court’s rejection of the economic 
equivalence emphasized by tax expenditure analysis implies that taxpayers 
have complete ownership of their pre-tax income, regardless of the 
underlying tax structure that allows individuals to retain more or less of that 
income.  The law also creates an entitlement to pre-tax income by allowing 
individuals a choice about supporting pubic goods and distribution and by 
then granting tax deductions if they do.  This bias in the tax law of charity is 
consistent with the tax law’s overall tendency to elevate private property 
 
 51. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 407, 415–18 (1999). 
 52. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 (2011) (noting 
that “the government declines to impose a tax” when it allows a credit). 
 53. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 54. Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law:  How the Roberts Court Has Reduced 
Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 778 (2013). 
 55. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 1447. 
 56. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2010). 
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and is the product of a particularly narrow conception of taxation.  This part 
explains why the inconsistent rhetoric and reality of charities in the tax law 
normalizes a particular conception of entitlement and undermines tax 
fairness. 
A.  Two Models of Taxation 
There are two ways to conceptualize the function of taxation.  One 
approach treats taxation as fundamental to determining individual shares of 
social product, and the other approach treats taxation as appropriation of 
private property.  A fair shares framework sees the tax system as a 
mechanism for dividing the returns to social cooperation among members 
of society.57  In a fair shares approach, individuals are not entitled to their 
entire pre-tax income because part of that income is the return to social 
cooperation that must be shared with others.  Distribution is the job of 
government under that approach—there is no redistribution because the 
returns to social cooperation are distributed before any claims are made on 
them.  Under the fair shares conception, pre-tax income is an arbitrary 
number that is normatively meaningless.  That approach treats taxation as 
an effective mechanism to distribute the returns to social cooperation across 
society.  So, while you may hold your pre-tax income, you are not entitled 
to own it. 
The opposite is true under the appropriation conception.  Where private 
property ownership is the baseline, taxation must satisfy a burden to prove 
that government appropriation is justified.58  This approach assumes that 
morally, individuals are entitled to their pre-tax income and that society has 
no presumptive right to any part of it, despite its essential role in the 
creation of all income.  Pre-tax income assumes central moral significance, 
and taxation can resemble slavery, as Robert Nozick dramatically 
claimed.59  The fair shares approach reflects a more expansive role for 
government and a correspondingly lower level of private prerogative than 
does the appropriation conception.  The tax law of charity is consistent with 
the appropriation model since it emphasizes choice and reinforces 
entitlement.  A more expansive understanding of public responsibility—
with taxation to finance it—would leave fewer resources in private hands 
for private decision making.60 
B.  Charity Law Supports an Entitlement to Pre-Tax Income 
Incentives for individual generosity make sense in a private entitlement 
conception of taxation.  The tax law of charity contributes to that 
 
 57. See Linda Sugin, Don’t Give Up on Taxes, 145 TAX NOTES 1374 (2014) (“The most 
fundamental tax fairness question asks what should be treated as private property and what 
should be treated as social product.”). 
 58. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:  TAXES AND 
JUSTICE (2002) (coining the term “everyday libertarianism” to describe this phenomenon). 
 59. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 169 (1974) (describing taxation as 
“forced labor”). 
 60. See infra Part IV. 
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conception by nudging individuals to choose altruism and thereby fund 
public goods and distribution.  The charitable deduction treats donors as 
taking from their private store of wealth to provide for the social good, 
reinforcing a private entitlement to pre-tax income.  Alternatively, the 
charitable deduction can be seen as a pure reward to donors for their public 
spiritedness, because there is no requirement that the deduction actually 
inure to the benefit of charities, as the term “incentive” implies.61 
The charitable deduction gives taxpayers a reason to believe that they are 
morally entitled to their pre-tax income because the tax law makes a mere 
request that individuals give and then compensates those who do by 
reducing their tax bill.  The tax law incentivizes contributions—signaling 
that a reasonable and rational member of society might legitimately choose 
not to pay for the public goods and redistribution that charities provide.  If 
we need to sweeten the deal for people to make them fund public goods and 
redistribution, then we create a normative context in which it is acceptable 
not to fund those things.  The characterization of donors as supporters of 
public purposes equates their contributions to charity with their tax 
payments to government, justifying lower taxation for the wealthy and a 
smaller public sector overall.  If the rich are already financing public goods 
and distribution privately, there is little need for the public sector to tax 
them and duplicate their efforts. 
Treating private philanthropy as a reasonable substitute for taxation 
mitigates the importance of the mandatory nature of taxation.  Individually 
directed giving becomes equivalent to publicly determined obligations.  
“Relieving the burdens of government” rhetoric gives a tax-like character to 
funds spent on private philanthropy.  Private giving is in lieu of—and 
equivalent to—the payment of taxes.62  The rhetoric suggests that taxation 
is similar and comes from the same place as philanthropy—an individual’s 
separately owned funds.  Consequently, the rhetoric fosters a strong 
entitlement to pre-tax income. 
Charity law promotes the private property interests of donors by giving 
donors more protection under the law of charity than anyone else.  The 
most generous tax benefits are only available for donors63—and are 
sometimes outrageously generous, such as the deduction equal to the fair 
market value of appreciated property.  If marginal tax rates exceed 50 
percent (as they have in the past), donors are paid a bonus by the 
government to give their appreciated assets to charity.64  Donors are entitled 
to deductions for their gifts, even if they donate to a foundation or fund that 
 
 61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 36, at 275. 
 63. The deduction is more valuable than the exemption. See Evelyn Brody, The Legal 
Framework for Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:  A RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 243. 
 64. Assume an asset is worth $100 and T has a zero basis.  If T has a marginal rate of 70 
percent, sale of the asset would produce $70 tax, leaving $30 for T to spend after tax.  If T 
instead donates it to charity, he is better off because he will enjoy a $100 tax deduction and 
pay no tax on the appreciation.  The deduction saves him $70 in tax, $40 more than he 
enjoys if he sells the property. 
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they continue to control and even if the money cannot be used by any 
charity for years.  The tax law requires that charities disclose their financial 
information publicly65—that disclosure enables donors to decide whether 
their money is well managed, even after it is irrevocably in the charity’s 
coffers.  The central feature of nonprofit law is the nondistribution 
constraint, which primarily protects donors because it ensures that charity 
managers use donations for the purpose of the organization, rather than for 
themselves.66  It is a feature of both federal tax law67 and state nonprofits 
law.68  Under state law, protection of donors is central.  Courts enforce 
donor’s gift restrictions, even if the restrictions are obsolete and the donor is 
long dead.69  States exert substantial efforts to combat fraud in charitable 
solicitations,70 which primarily protect the expectations of donors.  These 
elements of state nonprofits law contribute to a private conception of 
charity and treat donors as equivalent to owners. 
Due to the provisions of both federal and state law, donors continue to 
exert substantial power under state charities law long after their donation is 
complete.  And the law is largely designed to protect their interests.  To the 
contrary, tax revenue comes under the unfettered control of government 
immediately, and taxpayers have no rights to direct the use of their 
payments.71 
 
 65. 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2012). 
 66. Henry Hansmann’s theory explaining nonprofit organization is explicit in describing 
how the regime protects donors. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 
YALE L.J. 835, 862 (1980) (explaining that nonprofits exist to give confidence to donors). 
 67. This is the prohibition on inurement in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 68. This is the case in every state. See generally MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, 
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 
(2004). 
 69. Any request to modify the use of funds must be judicially determined in a “cy pres” 
proceeding.  Courts apply a high standard in allowing charities to modify their promises. See 
generally Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1993) 
(explaining the policy behind cy pres and reviewing arguments in the literature).  In a recent 
case, Paul Smith College was not permitted to change its name, even though the named 
donor is long dead. See In re Paul Smith’s Coll. of Arts & Scis., No. 2015-0597 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/283978772/Paul-Smith-s-College-decision 
[https://perma.cc/RY6H-AURR].  Similarly, the Buck Trust has to spend millions each year 
in Marin County—even though Marin does not quite know what to do with the money. In re 
Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug 15, 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 
691 (1987). 
 70. States adopted statutes, which the Court struck down under the First Amendment 
three times, holding that the laws placed various restrictions on charitable solicitations that 
were not sufficiently related to the state’s interest in preventing fraud. See Riley v. Nat’l 
Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. 
Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 
U.S. 620 (1980).  Nevertheless, the states continue to persevere in this area by bringing post-
hoc individualized fraud actions rather than legislating rules for allowable solicitations, see 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs. Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003), and by publicizing fundraising 
abuses, see e.g., Pennies for Charities:  Where Your Money Goes, N.Y. ST. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., 
http://charitiesnys.com/pfcmap/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
X22D-HJAV]. 
 71. There is no general taxpayer standing. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 
131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) (“[S]tanding cannot be based on a plaintiff’s mere status as a 
taxpayer.”). 
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C.  The Mismatch of Rhetoric and Reality Is a Problem 
It is not a problem that charity is private.  It is a problem that charity is 
private and coated with a public rhetoric.  That combination creates a bias 
against taxation that contracts the scope of government.  The mismatch 
offers justification for allocating responsibility for public purposes to 
private organizations.  It creates an appearance of enabling private 
organizations to engage in distribution, without actually requiring them to 
do so.  The U.S. tax system has the most generous tax subsidies for charity 
and the most robust private charitable sector in the world.72  These facts 
make it tempting to excuse government from its responsibility for providing 
public goods and distribution, even where private organizations cannot 
achieve goals on the scale of government. 
The public-purposes rhetoric surrounding charities creates the impression 
that private organizations are the appropriate solution to a wide range of 
public challenges.  We are accustomed to private organizations taking 
responsibility for the most standard kinds of public goods like elementary 
schools73 and public parks.74  The existence of a dynamic and well-funded 
charitable sector may obscure the need for public institutions to take 
responsibility for public goods and distribution. 
The critique widely made about charities reflects the hazard of the public 
rhetoric.  Charities are often (accurately) critiqued for exclusivity—they 
certainly can be exclusive when they are supported by the rich and perform 
functions that are specialized.75  But exclusivity is only damning if we 
accept that the function of charity is to be inclusive.  We only believe that 
charities should be inclusive because the rhetoric describes them as public, 
even though they are not.  Those who object to charities that do too little to 
help the poor assume that the proper role of charity is to help the poor.76  
But if that is not the objective, it is odd to judge them on those terms. 
Anyone who turns to charity for distribution cannot really be committed 
to distributive justice because the law of charity—which is fundamentally 
 
 72. See HUDSON INST., THE INDEX OF PHILANTHROPIC FREEDOM (2015), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/2015.06.15IndexofPhilanthro
IndexofPhi2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6DR-ZPKV]. 
 73. Charter schools are privately run, but heavily regulated.  They receive both public 
and private funding. 
 74. The Parks Conservancy is responsible for New York City’s Central Park. See About 
the Conservancy, CENT. PARK CONSERVANCY, http://www.centralparknyc.org/about/about-
cpc/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/F3SR-B8FU]. 
 75. See Teresa Odendahl, Charity Begins at Home:  Generosity and Self-Interest Among 
the Philanthropic Elite, reprinted in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES & MATERIALS 817 
(James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwartz eds., 4th ed. 2010); see also Peter Singer, Good 
Charity, Bad Charity, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/ 
11/opinion/sunday/good-charity-bad-charity.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3GNK-8GVC].  
Singer’s arguments are purely welfarist.  He argues that “we will achieve more if we help 
those in extreme poverty in developing countries, as our dollars go much further there.” Id. 
 76. John Colombo reviews the literature in The Role of Redistribution to the Poor in 
Federal Tax Exemption for Charities, 21 N.Y.U. NAT’L CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY & L. CONF. 
§ B (2009), http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/resources/documents/Conf2009JColombo 
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BYN-AZ4E]. 
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private—is not designed to make charities effective in distributing.  
Inability to effectively redistribute is simply a feature of charity design 
because it is privately funded and privately controlled.  Distributive justice 
requires centralized power and control—precisely what is purposely lacking 
in the charitable sector.77  A real commitment to distributive justice is only 
feasible for governments because only governments have sufficient scope 
and power. 
IV.  REDEFINING THE PROJECT OF DEFINING 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
This part outlines what a real commitment to distributive justice might 
demand of both government and the charitable sector.  It emphasizes the 
basic responsibilities of government in a just society, critiques the 
conventional efficiency-based explanation for charitable institutions, and 
concludes with a limited institutional approach to the charitable sector. 
A.  Start with a Normative Theory 
of Government Responsibility 
Based on a theory of good government, we need to better consider the 
proper allocation of private and government functions.  It is odd that we 
often start thinking about the legal regime for charities by asking what 
charities should do and how the law should treat them.  The justice of the 
tax treatment of charity cannot be determined in isolation.  Instead, the 
proper tax treatment of charity depends on the overall operation of the 
institutional structure of government.78  We cannot ask whether the tax 
provisions for charity are just, without also asking about all the other 
institutions of government involved in providing public goods and 
distribution.  An inadequate regime of government protection cannot be 
remedied by a generous private law of charity.  In a just society, charitable 
institutions would not need to provide public goods or distribution. 
In defining the tax treatment of charities, we need to better distinguish 
them from government.  In doing so, we can reinforce the obligation of 
government to provide public goods and redistribution.  If we justify the 
subsidy to charity because it does the things that government is best suited 
to do, then we obscure the real social benefit of charity, which consists of 
doing things better than, or different from, what the government can do.  
The existence of charity should not serve as an excuse for government to 
fall short in its responsibility to provide public goods and distribution.  The 
task for thinking about the role of charitable organizations depends on what 
needs to be private. 
 
 77. This is precisely why Robert Nozick rejects the notion of distributive justice, he 
says:  “There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the 
resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.” NOZICK, supra note 59, at 149. 
 78. This is a Rawlsian approach. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. 
ed. 1999) (justice is a matter of basic institutions). 
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The normative underpinning for the traditional subsidy theory for the tax 
exemption and charitable deduction for charities—provision of public 
goods and redistribution79—is also the explanation for taxation and public 
provision of services that are shared, scalable, or otherwise commonly 
enjoyed, such as clean water and national defense.  This precise overlap is 
problematic because it fails to give a unique justification for the charitable 
sector and fails to define the appropriate space for government compared to 
private organizations.  The public goods and distribution explanations are 
better explanations for government provision than they are for charitable 
provision, because economic theory predicts that private choices will lead 
to an underprovision of public goods and redistribution.80 
B.  Economic Theories Are Helpful, but Inadequate 
If we start by asking about government—what it should do—we are in a 
better position to demand a normative explanation for the division of the 
public and private sectors.  Much of the literature on the law of the 
charitable sector is economic.  Even legal scholars often turn to economic 
theories when thinking about charity law.  For example, Mark Hall and 
John Colombo’s donative theory explaining the exemption is an elaboration 
on Henry Hansmann’s economic analysis.81  Nina Crimm’s risk 
compensation theory of the exemption is also economic.82  So is Mark 
Gergen’s theory of the charitable deduction.83  Rob Atkinson has valiantly 
attempted to design a theory not based on economic analysis, and he 
continues to develop a philosophical approach.84  His instinct must be 
correct:  the division between sectors is a question of political morality, so 
we need a political theory that divides the public from the private. 
One of the leading economic theories explaining the separation of 
government functions and private nonprofit functions is Burton Weisbrod’s 
theory of government failure and the median voter.85  Weisbrod observes 
that the government must satisfy the median voter, and, consequently, there 
are many projects that the government cannot do.86  The theory presumes 
 
 79. See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 36, at 274. 
 80. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a 
Three-Sector Economy, in THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 51 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 
1977). 
 81. See generally JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX 
EXEMPTION (1995). 
 82. See generally Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption 
for Charitable Organizations:  A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419 (1998). 
 83. See generally Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 
74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988). 
 84. See Rob Atkinson, Philanthropy’s Function:  A Neo-Classical Re-Consideration, in 
NOT FOR PROFIT LAW:  THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 15 (Matthew Harding 
et al. eds., 2014); Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 
(1990) [hereinafter Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations]; Rob Atkinson, Tax 
Favors for Philanthropy:  Should Our Republic Underwrite De Tocqueville’s Democracy? 6 
WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1 (2014). 
 85. Weisbrod, supra note 80, at 53. 
 86. See id. at 59–61. 
2016]  RHETORIC AND REALITY IN THE TAX LAW OF CHARITY 2623 
that nonprofits will step in to fill the void where the political process 
prevents the government from acting. 
While the median voter theory may be a compelling explanation of the 
allocation of functions observed on the ground, it is only sometimes 
normatively attractive.  The median voter theory is informative as a positive 
matter—there are public goods that the median voter, for whatever reason, 
fails to value enough to demand that government provide them.  But that 
theory is not a normative theory of good government, and the question of 
how governments and private organizations should allocate responsibilities 
is a normative question.  If the median voter is selfish, it is still the 
obligation of government, and not private organizations, to guarantee the 
basic rights and freedoms of individuals in society. 
Where political posturing and ideological gridlock prevent the 
government from acting, government failure should be remedied directly.  
Irresponsible politics should not be a justification for allowing government 
to shirk fundamentally public responsibilities.  The limitations on 
government that arise from the majoritarian political process can be 
understood as falling in two categories:  (1)  the majority might be selfish 
and dishonorable, refusing to vote for the basic institutional requirements 
for a just society, and (2)  the majority might not have the taste for certain 
goods that would enrich social life and improve well-being. 
The government may only choose to defer to private organizations in the 
second category.  Even if the majority expresses a preference for inequality 
and exploitation, a just government cannot facilitate those things.  The basic 
rights of individuals, and the institutions that are necessary to guarantee 
freedom and equality, cannot be subject to the wishes of the median voter.  
Government has a responsibility to provide basic public goods and to 
coerce an unwilling public into a fair distribution.  Only after government 
has fulfilled its core responsibilities of guaranteeing just institutions can the 
majority choose to allocate functions to a fickle private sector. 
C.  A Rawlsian Model 
John Rawls’s theory of justice is helpful in thinking about the appropriate 
scope of charitable functions.  His theory concerns the requirements for 
public institutions, so it directs attention to obligations of government.  
Under Rawls’s conception of a just society, individuals must be guaranteed 
the liberties of equal citizenship and equality of opportunity.  In his two 
basic principles of justice, Rawls provides that 
each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others . . . .  The distribution of wealth and income, and positions of 
authority and responsibility, are to be consistent with both the basic 
liberties [of equal citizenship] and equality of opportunity.87 
 
 87. See RAWLS, supra note 78, at 53–54. 
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To Rawls, the project of justice is achieved at the political level—his is a 
political theory.  It is the job of political institutions to guarantee equality 
and freedom.88  Anything necessary for an individual to enjoy equal 
citizenship and equal opportunity must be guaranteed by government.  That 
obligation cannot be satisfied by delegation to a private organization that 
itself lacks an obligation to maintain the structure of a just society.89  The 
basic structure of government is grounded in political principles of justice 
rather than appeals to emotion; the guarantee of basic rights cannot depend 
on altruistic impulses.90 
Rawls makes a distinction between a property-owning democracy and 
welfare-state capitalism,91 which is instructive in thinking about the 
division between the public and private sectors.  Rawls rejects welfare-state 
capitalism in favor of property-owning democracy because “the background 
institutions of property owning democracy work to disperse the ownership 
of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent a small part of society from 
controlling the economy, and indirectly, political life as well.”92  This 
rejection of welfare-state capitalism is a rejection of explicit redistribution 
in favor of distribution.  Where there is no pre-social entitlement, 
redistribution is not necessary.  The background institutions, creation of 
which are the fundamental public obligation in Rawls’s theory, do all the 
work in achieving a just distribution of income and wealth. 
A society in which private organizations are responsible for public goods 
and distribution is one in which concentrations of wealth and power are 
perpetuated by those very institutions.  Too much responsibility in the 
hands of charitable organizations is inconsistent with a fair distribution by 
public institutions.  Power is unjustly concentrated where private 
organizations are responsible for important public functions.  Rawls has 
argued that the least advantaged should not be the object of compassion and 
charity, but are owed justice.  Consequently, he rejects ex post 
redistribution by government, in favor of fair cooperation at the outset so 
that an underclass never develops.  A just society does not need ex post 
redistribution because it provides ex ante opportunity.  The goal of creating 
social institutions should be to create the conditions in which everyone can 
participate and where all individual contributions to the social product are 
recognized and valued.93 
Rawls is particularly concerned about excessive concentrations of 
power.94  He is critical of excessive concentrations of wealth because of the 
effects that concentration might have on the political process.95  
 
 88. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS:  A RESTATEMENT 11 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) 
(“[J]ustice as fairness is a political, not a general, conception of justice.”). 
 89. Id. at 10 (“The basic structure is the background social framework within which the 
activities of associations and individuals take place.”). 
 90. Id. at 77. 
 91. Id. at 139. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. at 140. 
 94. Id. at 44. 
 95. Id. 
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Consequently, a system in which the basic tools of citizenship are entrusted 
to private organizations would be problematic.  For example, education, a 
prerequisite for equal opportunity, cannot be within the control of a small 
elite. 
There is a role for private organizations in Rawls’s theory.  He makes 
clear that freedom of association is essential in a just society so that 
individuals can develop and exercise their moral powers.96  Even where 
government effectively provides public goods and redistribution sufficient 
to guarantee equality and opportunity for all, there is substantial space for 
private organizations to further disparate ideas about the good.  A public 
structure that guarantees citizenship nurtures private organizations with 
pluralistic goals, and so Rawls’s theory is most consistent with the 
pluralism explanation for the nonprofit sector.97  But those private 
organizations do something very different from governments.  They serve a 
unique role in fostering social progress—a role particularly unsuited to 
government.  Because each individual has a right to develop her own 
conception of the good, no government may impose a single ideal.98  In 
developing individual conceptions, people need the opportunity to 
collaborate with others to better reach individual understandings of their 
own values.  In this way, private associations like charities have a crucial 
role in individual moral development that government cannot fulfill. 
Rawls includes the right to personal property among the basic rights.  He 
understands, however, that the right of personal property to be instrumental 
to the fundamental goal of independence and self-respect.99  His right to 
private property does not imply an entitlement to pre-tax income.  
Consequently, in designing actual institutions of society, we must consider 
how material needs affect the ability of individuals to be independent and 
self-respecting.  The right to private property is not the starting point from 
which principles of justice are derived.  Rather, private property can serve 
the goals of empowering individuals as equal citizens. 
D.  What Must Government Do? 
Rawls’s project endeavors to determine the terms of social cooperation.  
Individuals need to come together on terms of equality and mutual respect.  
Within the guarantees created by the basic structure, private organizations 
and the pluralism they promote can thrive.  But what are the institutions 
 
 96. Id. at 45. 
 97. See Brody, supra note 63, at 244 (“Philanthropy is private precisely because society 
prefers reasonable discretion exercised by different participants under different conditions to 
the uniformity of government-directed action.”); see also Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra 
note 36, at 275 (“A system that provides for diverse, decentralized decision making about 
which visions of public benefit merit support is well suited to a heterogeneous society, where 
many citizens prefer a supply of public goods—like culture, health, welfare, and protection 
of civil rights and the environment—that exceeds what majoritarian political processes will 
provide.”). 
 98. See RAWLS, supra note 88, at 18. 
 99. Id. at 114. 
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necessary to guarantee basic rights and liberties?  What do individuals need 
to exercise equal citizenship and enjoy equality of opportunity? 
At the very least, people need the basic minimums of food, clothing, and 
shelter.  A person struggling to satisfy basic needs is in no position to 
exercise political rights and freedom of thought.  The government must 
ensure these basics.  This is precisely where the rhetoric of charity law goes 
completely wrong—those who would argue that charitable organizations 
should do more to address poverty excuse government from its most basic 
responsibility.  It is only because government fails to do what a just 
government must do that we find ourselves in a world where private 
organizations fill the gap in providing basic social services.  The social 
responsibility for a basic minimum is not only consistent with Rawls’s 
theory, but it also has roots in G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of property100 and is 
essential to other philosophical conceptions of freedom.  Philippe Van 
Parijs has made the basic minimum a cornerstone of his theory,101 and 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach is built on the principle that individuals 
need the tools to exercise autonomy.102 
A basic minimum must include health care and education.103  Under the 
first principle of justice, Rawls includes “the rights and liberties specified 
by the liberty and integrity (physical and psychological) of the person.”104  
Since equality is at the core of Rawls’s theory, the basic structure must 
ensure that the natural and social differences that individuals possess do not 
translate into disparate opportunities or outcomes.105  Health care and 
education are key. 
Distribution is an essential role of government.  Just distribution is 
possible, but only if government is willing to use the coercive power of 
taxation to address inequality.  Charities can assist in administering 
redistribution and can supplement public efforts, but the structure of charity 
under current law is completely unsuited to fully address the problem.  
Until markets are able to distribute the returns of social cooperation to 
everyone, government distribution will be necessary to account for the 
morally arbitrary returns to natural talents and social advantages.106 
E.  What Does That Leave for Private Organizations? 
The sphere for private organizations depends on what is left after the 
government fulfills its obligations.  The traditional subsidy theory asks what 
public goods are produced in the private sector and then grants an 
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exemption where pubic benefits are produced privately.  But it would be 
better to ask what government is not suited to do.  Creative, original, and 
critical projects need protection from government pressure, orthodoxy, and 
funding.  Private organizations are necessary to challenge and check 
government.  Movements for social change, the arts, and religion are prime 
candidates for protection from government budgeting.  As Rawls notes, 
“[A] democratic political society has no such shared values and ends apart 
from those falling under or connected with the political conception of 
justice itself.”107  Consequently, a just society must leave room for private 
institutions to explore disparate values and goals because government is 
unable to do so.  The Constitution forbids a state church, but rejection of a 
public orthodoxy in faith is the best reason for requiring that religion be 
private. 
In a Rawlsian conception, pluralism is a political imperative, not an 
economic one.  Fostering a broad set of choices about value is necessary if 
individuals are going to exercise freedom to determine what is meaningful 
in their lives.  Government is in a poor position to compare 
incommensurable goals.  In allocating resources to different projects, 
government must compare and value defense, education, health, 
environmental protection, et cetera along a single dimension.  Government 
budgets must determine how much of a limited total to devote to any area.  
In that process, some clear public goals will receive less than they need.  
The ranking of importance for government responsibility must relegate 
certain purposes to the bottom.  For example, government may legitimately 
prioritize health over other public goals on the theory that physical well-
being is the most basic requirement of a stable economy and a democratic 
citizenry.  The elevation of health is reasonable even if everyone also agrees 
that national defense and education are also important.  More ephemeral 
goals are likely to lose out in these kinds of comparisons. 
Private charity is the mechanism to avoid these direct comparisons.  
Resisting reduction to a single conception of value is crucial to a society 
rich in ideas and possibilities.  Rawls’s imperative to allow each individual 
to determine what is meaningful in life demands this variety.  In Rawlsian 
society, the state creates the infrastructure in which private activity can 
flourish.  But that flourishing is varied, inconsistent, and necessarily 
private. 
Some institutions need to be actively protected from government 
interference.  The problem is not just that government will fail to fund 
them, but that government will actively abuse them.  This is apparent in the 
arts and explains why the arts are more precarious as public institutions 
than as private institutions.  The story of the Detroit Institute of the Arts 
(DIA) illustrates why cultural institutions need to be private:  their assets 
need legal protection from government for them to exist.  When Detroit’s 
recent financial difficulties peaked, its emergency manager considered 
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selling off the DIA’s collection to pay the city’s debts,108 which totaled 
approximately $18 billion.109  It was clear that the manager had the legal 
power to do so110 and many competing public interests to address.  
Government cannot be expected to compare pension needs to cultural 
preservation.  The museum was ultimately saved by reverting to private 
nonprofit ownership and control.111 
Since private organizations play a crucial role in a just society, there is no 
reason to be ambivalent about their being private.  Recognition of the 
unique value of private organizations should produce greater transparency 
about their private nature.  If public institutions guarantee equality and 
freedom, there is no need to apologize for the private nature of charity by 
veiling it in a rhetoric of publicness.  Donors can support anything they 
want, and they should be allowed to do so because a just society includes a 
substantial sphere of control for private organizations and includes private 
property as a basic right.112  The argument that some charities are too rich is 
a non sequitur in a world in which charities are transparently private, 
individuals are sufficiently taxed to fund public obligations, and 
government fully funds its responsibilities.113 
V.  WHAT ABOUT THE TAX LAW? 
Currently, the tax law bears tremendous pressure for instrumental social 
policies because the government fails to satisfy its basic responsibilities.  If 
government better satisfied the demands described in Part IV by 
guaranteeing basic minimums—education and health—then the tax law of 
charity would be less important to justice.  This part imagines a more 
circumscribed—and unabashedly private—function for charities that is 
nevertheless important. 
A.  Tax Law Should Favor Pluralism 
The tax law should embrace charity because it is private and can 
therefore provide social benefits that government is ill-equipped to provide.  
Charity’s basic institutional values are “freedom to try new and 
experimental programs, diversity of approaches, [and] multiple centers of 
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initiative.”114  The opportunity to pursue and discuss innovative or new 
ideas in a private setting “offers a chance for participants who otherwise 
would be shut out of government or the market to take part in deliberative 
self-determination, a fundamental part of what it means to be human.”115  
The social good in diversity arises only where it is private.116 
Private charity is an important social good even if it does not relieve the 
burdens of government or achieve other broad public purposes.  Society 
benefits from nonprofit organizations “not just because of what they do, but 
because of what they are, because their very existence is a guarantee of the 
diversity that protects the freedom of all of us.”117  Nonprofit organizations 
generate what Rob Atkinson has called metabenefits—“benefits that derive 
not from what product is produced or to whom it is distributed, but rather 
from how it produced or distributed.”118  The fostering of pluralism and the 
promotion of diversity are metabenefits that are inherently desirable.119  
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bob Jones is a powerful legal endorsement 
of pluralism over publicness.  He argued that “private, non-profit groups 
receive tax exemptions because each group contributes to the diversity of 
association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic 
society.”120  The pluralism justification for the charitable sector and its tax 
benefits best fits charity’s appropriate place in a just society. 
B.  Redesign the Charitable Deduction 
Following from a policy based on pluralism, the charitable deduction can 
be more transparent about subsidizing private organizations.  The language 
of the statute and the regulations could remove any reference to public 
purposes.121  In its place, they could substitute explicit support of 
organizations that challenge government and foster diverse values. 
Alternatively, the charitable deduction could be replaced with a non-tax 
approach.  Charitable gifts can be reported to the government, which could 
gross up private gifts with public funds paid directly to charity.122  The 
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regime can be just as economically generous as current law, but without 
creating an entitlement to pre-tax income.123  It could continue to steer 
government support to institutions chosen by taxpayers in proportion to 
their support.124  Even if the amount and source of gifts received is 
information that the government needs to know for it to direct some of the 
revenue it collects, the government does not need to collect that information 
on tax returns, or from donors at all. 
Transforming the deduction into a grant that is actually paid by 
governments directly to charities has practical and theoretical benefits.  
Separating individual taxpayers from the government subsidy to charity 
would address the bias in favor of private property and against taxation 
inherent in the current design of the charitable tax provisions.  This design 
negates the message of entitlement to pre-tax income by ensuring that the 
government subsidy is not paid through the individual taxpayer.  It 
establishes the nonsubstitutability of tax payments and charitable giving 
because tax liability does not change on account of charitable giving.  A 
direct subsidy prevents possible donor capture that current law makes 
possible, increasing the benefit to charitable organizations.125  As an added 
bonus, this redesign could get rid of some of the quirks of current law, like 
the upside-down subsidy and the deduction’s unavailability to itemizers.126 
The corollary to this, of course, is that taxpayers should be required to 
pay tax, regardless of their charitable gifts, in keeping with a fair shares 
approach to taxation.  Requiring taxpayers to pay tax on all income, without 
a reduction for charitable donations, refutes the implication that all the pre-
tax income is properly in the dominion and control of the taxpayer.  This is 
true even if the government subsidizes charities favored by donors to the 
same extent as under current law. 
C.  Tax Benefits for Charity Should Not Have a High Hurdle 
The tax law of charity is too important.  It institutionalizes the belief that 
private organizations can achieve public goals, and we depend on it for 
public goods and redistribution.  If we instead focus on government, there is 
less pressure on the tax benefits for charity because there is less that 
charities must do.  A more just society might—or might not—have fewer 
resources in the charitable sector, but it would certainly have more 
resources in the public sector.  At the same time, there is little reason to 
deny tax benefits to private organizations, as long as those tax benefits do 
not suggest that private organizations can satisfy fundamentally public 
responsibilities. 
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Because the IRC defines charities and carves out tax benefits for them,127 
the tax law places a heavy burden of justification on the charitable tax 
provisions; it frames the tax question as about charities.  Lots of institutions 
and activities receive tax benefits, and the standard of public benefit for 
them is low.  Charitable tax benefits should not have a higher burden of 
proof than tax benefits in other areas.  In the business area, there are 
dubious public benefits for bonus depreciation, oil exploration, and 
investment in video games.  In the individual area, there is no evidence that 
preferences for capital income produce greater investment and economic 
growth.128  To the contrary, many tax benefits clearly undermine public 
values.  The preference enjoyed by hedge-fund managers and the realization 
rule undermine equality.  Tax benefits for fossil fuel exploration benefits 
and employee parking undermine environmental protection.  Why single 
out charities for the highest scrutiny? 
The scrutiny of charitable tax benefits is misplaced because tax benefits 
do not define charities.  They make up a small part of total charity support; 
fees for services are the largest single source of funds for charities.129  
Volunteer time is valuable, though nonmonetary.130  The after-tax cost of 
donations substantially exceeds the subsidy received from government as 
long as marginal tax rates remain relatively low.  The tax exemption may 
provide no economic benefit at all,131 and the charitable deduction may be 
necessary to define income properly.132  The tax expenditure budget scores 
the charitable deduction so high because it ignores some of the most 
substantial benefits built into the tax system, like the realization rule and 
imputed income.133 
Since most of the resources in the nonprofit sector do not arise from tax 
benefits, the attention on tax subsidies is excessive.  Scholars and courts 
treat the tax deduction for contributions as the most important legal hook 
for regulation, but it is really a relatively weak support for a growing 
regulatory structure.134  Charities contribute to the excessive focus on the 
charitable deduction by treating any change—even ones likely to their 
benefit—as mortal threats.135  If we lower the scrutiny level, it becomes 
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clear that the tax benefits for charity—in the scheme of the tax system as a 
whole—are reasonable given the important contributions of charities to 
diversity and freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the tax law of charity is important in creating 
a private property entitlement, challenging both the intuition that charity is 
altruistic and the rhetoric that charity is public serving.  This perspective on 
charity demands a reassessment of the proper role of government compared 
to private institutions and leads to the conclusion that government cannot 
depend on private organizations to guarantee equality and freedom.  The 
law of charity is not designed to ensure that charitable funds go to the 
neediest recipients or the most important social purposes.  Nevertheless, 
charity—even as currently defined by law—is important and desirable, and 
tax benefits for it are easily justified in the current legal scheme.  When 
government assumes greater responsibility for establishing just institutions, 
the expectation that charities will replace government underperformance 
may no longer be necessary. 
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